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NOTES
CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO THE NATURAL
GAS PIPELINE INDUSTRY: THE FPC AND
THE CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE
AND NECESSITY
The bitterest conflicts in public utility fields are not always provoked
by substantive questions of how to regulate. The most recent Congres-
sional struggles with respect to the administration of the Natural Gas
Act' by the Federal Power Commission2 have centered around the
extent of the Commission's jurisdiction over the natural gas industry.3
The statutory limitation of that jurisdiction to the transportation and
wholesaling of gas in interstate commerce, presumed to be reasonably
discrete from production and gathering at one extremity and local dis-
tribution at the other,4 has proved a fruitful source of controversial
ambiguity. However, while the issues of federalism and the original
Congressional intent behind the NGA have held the stage, basic questions
of the appropriateness of public utility regulation to the various segments
of the natural gas industry have had a considerable, if somewhat obscure,
impact on the course of discussion. 5
It is of peculiar significance in this regard that the period since the
enactment of the NGA has been one of rising disenchantment with public
utility regulation via governmental commission. Many have criticized
the lack of initiative and independence displayed by commissions.0 More
serious exception has been taken to the narrowness of the functions which
1. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1946). Hereinafter NGA.
2. Hereinafter FPC.
3. See Berger and Krash, The Status of Independent Producers under the Natural
Gas Act, 30 TEx. L. REV. 29 (1951); Comments, 17 U. OF CHL L. REv. 479 (1950) ;
59 YALE L J. 1468 (1950) ; Note, 52 COL. L. REv. 135 (1952). A climax to the long
and presently inconclusive struggle is provided by Wisconsin v. FPC, 21 U. S. L. WEEK
2586 (D.C. Cir. May 22, 1953), which reverses the Commissions interpretation of the
scope of its own authority in Phillips Petroleum Co., F.P.C. Opinion No. 217 (1951).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717(b), 717a(c) (1946).
5. The major issues have concerned the production and gathering of natural gas.
See, e.g., Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Comnittee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on H.R. 4051, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 352-353 (1948); in particular,
note the Subcommittee report, id. at 571. Also see Hearings before the Senate Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 210 et seq. (1949), and note
the Committee report printed therein at 518. As has been noted, however, there has been
little discussion of the merits of the issues in this sense. See Comment, 59 YALE L.J.
1468, 1469 (1950).
6. See, e.g., BAUER, TRANSFOR.NIlNG PU3LIC UTILITY REGULATION (1950); Fainsod,
Regulation and Efficiency, 49 YALE L.J. 1191 (1940). See also Huntington. The
Maoraismas of the ICC: The Commission, The Railroads, and the Public Interest,
61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952); but see Morgan, Critique of "The Marasmnus of the ICC:
The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest," 62 YALE L.J. 171 (1953).
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commissions have assumed to be theirs.7 Such narrowness may simply
be an index of the extent to which regulators unconsciously simplify the
picture of economic life which guides their regulation. It seems more
likely that it is a conscious assertion of their incapacity for, or the
unwisdom of, further expansion of authority. Attempts of the commis-
sions to define their own function may be seen with particular clarity
in their use of a characteristic instrument of control, the certificate of
convenience and necessity.8 Review and analysis of the criteria used by
the FPC in granting such certificates should bring insight into the
perplexities involved in efforts to broaden the functions of a public utility
commission and, incidentally, into the meaning of recent jurisdictional
struggles.
The complexity of the issues which may come to bear upon any one
certification case renders generalization difficult at best. Understanding
of the certification process, however, may be aided by initial oversimplifi-
cation. This can be accomplished by an examination of criteria for the
granting of certificates in a simplified market situation, followed by the
introduction of the more complicated realities of the natural gas market.
I. Simple Market Situation
A. Single Seller
Criteria for certification were first announced in a 1939 case, Kansas
Pipeline and Gas Co.9 The Kansas Pipeline and Gas Company (Kansas)
7. See, e.g., Gray, The Passing of the Public Utility Concept, 16 LAND ECONOMICS
(then entitled THE JOURNAL OF LAND & PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS) 8 (1940), re-
printed in READINGS IN THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF INDUSTRY (1942); HALL, STATE CON-
TROL OF BUSINESS THROUGH CERTIFICATES OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY 109 et seq.
(1948). The two types of criticism are not, of course, unrelated. See Fainsod, supra
note 6. The "narrowness" critique was directed at the FPC's handling of the natural
gas industry by Mr. Justice Jackson in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591,
628 (1944) (dissent).
8. Such certificates are in the nature of permits for operation as a public utility
or for expansion of facilities, see BARNES, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
229 (1942), and TROXEL, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 191 (1947), and are histori-
cally linked to the rise of public utility regulation by state commissions. See BEHLING,
MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION IN PUBLIC UTILITY INDUSTRIES 25, 64 (1938). Under the
NGA they were originally only required of companies building lines to markets already
served by other natural gas companies, 52 STAT. 824 (1938); but in 1942 the act was
amended to require that all natural gas companies subject to the jurisdiction of the
FPC obtain certificates, 56 STAT. 83 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f (1946).
9. 2 F.P.C. 29 (1939). See Wheat, Adminidstration by the Federal Power Coin-
mission of the Certificate Provisions of the Natural Gas Act, 14 GRo. WASH. L REv. 194
(1945). Neither of the applicants in the case met all the criteria laid down, so that
the opinion is a declaration of intention to issue certificates when the requirements are
fulfilled. As neither, again; ever met those requirements in full, both applications were
later dismissed. 2 F.P.C. 939 (1941).
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proposed construction of a 1,300 mile line from the Hugoton gas field
in southwestern Kansas to the Mesabi iron range in northeastern Minne-
sota. North Dakota Consumers Gas Company (North Dakota) pro-
jected a line from western North Dakota 198 miles east to the Minnesota-
North Dakota border. The applications conflicted as to service to a
few towns on both sides of that border, but there is no indication that
the Commission ever considered allowing more than one company to
serve those markets.10 Explicit showing as to gas supply, potential
demand, financing, costs, proposed rates and probable revenues was re-
quired.
The key showing was clearly one of demand. The supply requisite
was one "... . adequate to meet those demands which it is reasonable to
assume will be made. .. "."I' Other requirements, designed to ensure con-
tinuous and adequate service, were similarly functions of demand. Thus
estimated costs and financing should be adequate to carry the project
through.' 2 At the same time there was considerable anticipation of rate
base problems. Fixed charges resulting from financing, as well as con-
struction and operating costs, should be reasonable.' 3 The price at which
the gas supply was to be purchased was scrutinized,' 4 and showing of
the reasonableness of projected rates and revenue required.' 5
10. It is essential to distinguish competitive applications of this nature from cases
in which the existence of two or more sellers in a single market is a serious possibility.
It might seem that prior to the 1942 amendment, see note 8 supra, the latter situation was
the only one which could arise in a certificate case before the FPC. The Commission's
interpretation of the spacial limits of a market already served by a natural gas company,
however, was so broad as almost to eliminate the element of competition with established
companies. Kansas Pipeline and Gas Co., 2 F.P.C. 29, 35 (1939). Of the two companies
in the instant case whose "markets ' were to be invaded by the proposed new lines,
one was the supplier of North Dakota and had considerable control over that company.
Id. at 43. The other did not bother to intervene in opposition to the certificates. See
also Wheat, supra note 9, at 196.
11. Kansas Pipeline and Gas Co., 2 F.P.C. 29, 40 (1939).
12. Id. at 52, 53.
13. Id. at 53.
14. Id. at 41, 44.
15. Id. at 55. At this time the examination of rates was justified by reference to
a specific statutory direction to take into account an applicant's ability to charge prices
" ...lower than those prevailing in the territory to be served, it being the intention
of Congress that natural gas shall be sold in interstate commerce for resale . . .at the
lowest possible reasonable rate . . . ." 52 STAT. 824 (1938), which was eliminated by the
1942 amendment. See note 8 supra. There can be little doubt, however, that the general
purpose of protection of consumers is a sufficient basis for requiring a showing of the
reasonableness of proposed rates in certificate proceedings. See Kentucky Natural Gas
Corp. v. F.P.C., 159 F.2d 215, 219 (6th Cir. 1947), where the court seemed to be making
this point, although it deemed a direct ruling on the question of the Commission's au-
thority to so investigate rates unnecessary on the facts of that case. The FPC has con-
tinued to give emphasis to the relative level of rates proposed by competing applicants,
see Eugene H. Cole (Erie Gas Service Co., Inc.) F.P.C. Opinion No. 205 (1951), and
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On the whole, then, the Commission was primarily concerned with
consumer interests, going so far as to say that in an area without natural
gas service the public convenience and necessity would always require
its introduction, provided the applicant company could meet the minimum
standards laid down for ability to provide adequate service.' 6 Investor
interests were assumed, for the most part, to be taking care of them-
selves. 1 7 Finally, producers were not completely ignored. The choice of
North Dakota to serve the disputed markets was based upon, among
other factors, the need to provide pipiline outlets for the Montana gas
fields from which that applicant's supply was to be drawn.'"
Since 1939 the criteria mentioned have remained the basic factors
around which the certification process has operated. Although the 1942
amendment to the NGA added the factors of an- applicant's ability and
willingness to the primary requisite that the project be required by the
present or future public convenience and necessity, the FPC had already
stressed ability to provide continuous and adequate service. 19 The method
by which a showing of any particular requirement is established changes,
of course, from case to case and is very much the province of the expert
guess. The primary question to which attention is here addressed is the
effectiveness with which these criteria and the attitudes behind them meet
the impact of broader issues, such as competition between two or more
sellers.
B. Two or More Sellers
Coincident with the criticism of public utility regulation in general,
there have been persistent challenges to the notion that public utility
industries are, in the main, "natural" or "inherent" monopolies. 2 0 "Coi-
has undertaken extensive investigation of proposed rate structures in many certificate
cases involving only one applicant. See note 62 infra.
16. Kansas Pipeline and Gas Co., 2 F.P.C. 29, 56 (1939). This statement by the
Commission may be challenged on grounds not developed in the present context. See
pp. infra.
17. "Adequacy" of return, as opposed to "reasonableness," takes on importance in
the context of Commission authorization of the entry of a new seller into the market
of an established seller or the simultaneous entry of two sellers into a market not yet
served by any natural gas company. See note 58 infra, and accompanying text.
18. - Kansas Pipeline and Gas Co., 2 F.P.C. 29, 59 (1939).
19. The present statutory criteria are that the applicant be "able and willing prop-
erly to do the acts and to perform the service proposed and to conform to the provisions
of the Act and the requirements, rules, and regulations of the Commission thereunder,"
and that the project " . . . is or will be required by the present or future public con-
venience and necessity. . . . " 56 STAT. 84 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f (e) (1946). Present
Commission regulations setting forth the type of evidence which applicants should submit
in filing for certification follow the outline of the Kansas case criteria. 18 CODE FED.
REGS. §§ 157.5-157.22 (Supp. 1952).
20. See BEBLING, op. cit. supra note 8, c. IV; Comment, A Re-Examination of
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petition," apparently defined as any form of market organization short
of the effective presence of only one seller, has been proposed not only
as an aid to underpaid, understaffed and not always competent commis-
sions 21 but also as desirable for its own sake in many public utility
fields.2 2
The major argument against "competition," so defined, is couched in
terms of "wasteful duplication of facilities" and "cutthroat competi-
tion."12 3 Translated into an economic standard applicable to particular
cases, the amount of goods demanded in any one market is such that one
physical plant serving that market can more nearly approach the sales
volume at which average cost per unit is optimum than can any larger
number of plants.2 4 This in turn is usually attributed to the presence of
high "fixed" or initial costs.2 5 In consequence, the entry of a second
seller means that neither will be able to operate near optimum unit cost
(the facilities represented by fixed costs are "duplicated"), and resources
which could be put to use elsewhere are wasted. Further, for each seller
any increase in volume of sales will decrease unit costs (up to the point
at which unit cost is the lowest possible, i.e., optimum), so that there is a
strong temptation toward price wars and "cutthroat competition" often
ending in merger or consolidation of the rival companies .2  The losses
incurred during such wars would generally be reflected in higher prices
subsequent to the merger.
Competition in Gas and Electric Utilities, 50 YALE L.J. 875 (1941); Lake, Competition
im the Public Utility Fields, 10 Miss. L.J. 197 (1938); Jourolman, Social Performance
of Public Utilities: Effects of Monopoly and Competition, 17 TENN. L. Rxv. 308 (1942).
But see BONBRIGHT, PUBLIC UTILITIES AND TlE NATIoNAL PoWER POLIcY (1940).
21. The argument runs that, for the reasons cited and occasionally because of a
lack of statutory authority, the commissions' control over regulated industries may be
comparatively limited. See. e.g., Comment, supra note 20, at 879.
22. Lake, supra note 20, at 218, agrues this point as a matter of providing maximum
freedom for individuals to enter various businesses of their choice. The Federal Com-
munications Commission's claim that there is a national policy in favor of as much
competition as possible in all fields has been denied by the Supreme Court. Federal
Communications Comm'n v. RCA Communications, Inc., 73 Sup. Ct. 998 (1953).
23. See BEHLING, op. cit. supra note 8, at 37 et seq.; TRoxEt, op. cit. supra note 8,
at 38, 192.
24. The notion is that of a "decreasing cost industry." See BEHLING, op. cit. supra
note 8, at 35; BOWEN, TOWARD SOCIAL ECONOMY c. 17 (1948). In the first instance the
argument runs to the optimum size of physical plant, but the economies which unified
management of several plants may bring may be considerable. See note 61 infra.
25. See BEHLING, op. cit. supra note 8, c. III; TRoxEL, op. cit. supra note 8, at 32
et seq. As Behling points out, it is really a question of the predominance of fixed over
variable costs rather than the absolute level of fixed costs. The difficulty of storing
many public utility products necessitates provision of capacity sufficient to meet peak
demands and is thus a potent source of the predominance.
26. See Gray, Public Utility Competition: A Case Study, 15 LAND EcoNoMics 195
(1939), and note 23 supra.
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It is not altogether clear that such ruinous consequences will always
follow the introduction of "competition." 27 Further, the proponents of
"competition" as an aid to regulation claim that there is more incentive
to achieve such goals as efficiency, courtesy and technological develop-
ment where there are two or more sellers. 28 For purposes of public utility
fields attention can be restricted to cases involving a very few sellers.
Economic theory and investigation indicate that in such a market each
seller's awareness of his rivals' reactions to his own moves, particularly as
to prices, keeps the emphasis off price competition. 29  The spur to reduce
costs and rates associated with "competition," then, would not necessarily
be present.
But is has been argued that this prognostication overlooks the way
in which a commission can change the picture. To the extent, for in-
stance, that minimum rate control is effective, it can eliminate the fear
of price wars and ruinous competition, which some think is a major cause
of the tenderness with which such sellers approach price reductions.3 0
In recent years, however, the thought that markets with but few sellers
will display rigid prices, mainly because of the fear of price wars, has
given way to the realization that the factors which such sellers take into
27. It has been argued that commissions, through their control over mergers and
minimum prices, can avoid such destructive competition. See Comment, supra note 20,
at 879; Lake, supra note 20, at 206. Without attempting to pass final judgment upon this
contention, it can be noted that it presumes strong action by commissions of a sort not
likely to be immediately popular with consumers and adequacy on their part, in the
examination of costs, sufficient to assure sellers that their rivals will not be able to
wage price war upon them under the cover of commission-allowed rate reductions-
two rather tenuous assumptions, especially in the light of the original argument that
"competition" is needed because of the lack of commission initiative and ability.
28. See Comment, supra note 20, at 881; Lake, supra note 20, at 238. This con-
tention does not cover the entire argument since, for some, "competition" is a social
ideal carrying values other than economic. The term "economic" is used here in the
restricted sense of "pertaining to the allocation of scarce means so as to realize to a
maximum extent a given system of ends." See KNIGHT, FREEDOM AND REFORM 137 n.5
(1947). In this sense Lake, supra note 20, is arguing from a non-economic ideal. See
note 22 supra. It should be noted, however, that Henry Simons, certainly one of the
outstanding defenders of competition as an ideal transcending the economic sphere,
argued for monopolistic organization of public utility industries under public owner-
ship. Simons, The Requisites of Free Competition, 26 AM. Ecox. REv. 68 (Supp. 1936).
29. See CHAMBERLIT, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (6th ed. 1950);
FELLNER, COMPETITION AMONG THE Fnw (1949).
The status of technological change in a more as opposed to a less competitive market
is a matter of some dispute. See FLNER, op. cit. supra at 282-291; ScHumpErm,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISMr AND DEMocRAcy c. VII, VIII (2d ed. 1947); Bowman, Toward
Less Monopoly, 101 U. OF PA. L. REv. 577, 621-630 (1953). The fact that, for public
utility fields, the comparison must be between a market with one seller and one with at
most a few sellers further reduces the significance which can be attached to claims for
competition as a spur to innovation.
30. See Comment, supra note 20, at 882. Factors tending to limit commission use
of minimum price control and its effectiveness have already been mentioned. See note 27
supra.
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account and the pattern of action to be expected of them are much more
complex.31 At this point the entire question of the effects of minimum
price control becomes speculative.
A less speculative claim supporting regulated "competition" is that
made for the efficacy with which the threat of permitting entry by a
competitor or the grant of prospective new customers to an already
present rival can be used by commissions as a club to wield over the heads
of recalcitrant companies.32 This weapon may well be effective, but its
applicability is likely to be restricted to periods in which the market
for the utility product is expanding sufficiently to provide the plum of
additional customers to be awarded to the efficient; a period of declining
demand is likely to involve prospects of duplication and ruinous competi-
tion following upon the entry of a second seller, as both companies feel
the pinch of high fixed costs.
All of these issues--duplication, the consequences of "regulated
competition," the limits of commission action in a "competitive" public
utility market-come to bear upon individual cases both where the market
is limited to a single town or city and where it includes an entire area.33
The significance of the distinction between "area" and "town" competi-
tion, for present purposes, lies in the fact that division of the market
between companies, either by commission action or by company policy,
may more readily occur in the context of competition over a large area.34
The relative distance of various customers from the major lines would, of
course, be reflected in costs to the sellers and price of service to them,
so that division of the market on a spacial basis becomes more attractive
as the distances involved become substantial. 35
The most recent of the two major competition cases which the FPC
has faced concerned introduction of natural gas service to the New
31. See FELLNER, op. cit. supra note 29, at 180-181, and the works cited therein.
32. Commission efforts in this direction are noted in BEHLING, op. cit. supra note
8, at 61.
33. The distinction is drawn in Comment, supra note 20, at 880.
34. See BEHLING, op. cit. supra note 8, at 70-71.
35. The 1942 amendment provided that the Commission may determine "service
areas" within which a natural gas company could enlarge its facilities without certifica-
tion. 53 STAT. 84, 15 U.S.C. §717f(f) (1946). Determination of such areas on a
geographical basis, however, involved such difficulties in the way of overlapping, and
uncertainty of future plans for expansion that the FPC finally recommended adoption
of a rule allowing expansion of facilities without certification up to a certain percentage
of authorized capacity, with provisions for notice to the Commission so that it might
intervene if it thought a certificate was required. See FPC, NATURAL GAS INVESTIGA-
TION (Docket G-580), Report of Commissioners Smith and Wimberly 480-498 (1948).
The order which was finally adopted in 1949 simply excluded certain named types of
facilities and those required for emergency provision of adequate service from certificate
requirements. See F.P.C. Order No. 148, 14 FED. REG. 681-682 (1949) and 18 CODE FED.
REGs. §§ 2.55, 157.22 (Supp. 1952).
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England area.30 As there was no pipeline company serving the area at the
time, there was no question of a presently inadequate service which the
Commission hoped to cure by allowing, entry of a new seller. Still, the
motive for the attempt to divide the area between the two applicants was
not dissimilar. It was the limited nature of FPC power to compel exten-
sions of service, combined with the fact that neither applicant proposed
service to the entire area, which bothered the majority of the Commis-
sioners.37 Add to this the pressure toward getting gas to New England
before the winter space-heating season, and one has a setting for attempts
at quick resolution.
There was no question here but that authorization of two lines to
the area meant some duplication." There was some question whether the
costs of one company, in relation to the market assigned to it, would allow
it an adequate return.8 9 But the Commission distrusted both applicants,
reading them a stinging lecture in its first opinion in the case, 40 and
went out of its way to allow one of them time to meet minimum supply
and other requirements. 41 The theory of this action was that, over the
36. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 9 F.P.C. 262 (1950), Tennessee Gas Trans-
mission Co., 9 F.P.C. 271 (1950), United Gas Pipeline Co., F.P.C. Opinion No. 206
(1951), and Northeastern Gas Transmission Co., F.P.C. Opinion No. 208 (1951), are
the major opinions in the case so far.
37. See Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 9 F.P.C. 271, 281 (1950) ; Commissioner
Wimberly's concurring opinion in United Gas Pipe Line Co., supra note 36, at 2 of his
opinion. Cf. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. FPC, 21 U.S.L. WEEK 2536 (3rd Cir.
April 30, 1953).
38. The first opinion in the case stated that the two applications before it in-
volved duplication, that it was desirable that one company serve the whole area, and
that proceedings would be reopened if the Commission received any fair proposal along
those lines. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 9 F.P.C. 262 (1950). See also Tennessee
Co., 9 F.P.C. 271, 279-281, 283-284 (1950).
39. See Commissioner Buchanan's dissents, Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 9
F.P.C. 271, 298 (1950); United Gas Pipe Line Co., F.P.C. Opinion No. 206 (1951).
Compare the majority opinions Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., supra at 281; United
Gas Pipe Line Co., supra at 43.
40. "It is clear to us that these applicants . . . have placed their own selfish in-
terests, and the interests of those with whom they are associated, above the best
interests of the public." Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 9 F.P.C. 262, 266 (1950). The
fear that either of the two applicants would pick and choose customers or discriminate
against some of those they might serve was undoubtedly increased by the fact that
two-thirds of the common stock of one, Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. (Algonquin),
was owned by two corporations owning various manufactured gas distributing companies
in the area who were prospective customers. See United Gas Pipe Line Co., stspra
note 39, at 46. Certificates to both companies were conditioned to require that rates be
non-discriminatory as between various distributors in the area. Tennessee Gas Trans-
mission Co., 9 F.P.C. 271, 291, 295 (1950); United Gas Pipe Line Co., suepra at 62,
66.
41. The first certificate was granted to Northeastern Gas Transmission Co. (North-
eastern) on November 8, 1950, Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 9 F.P.C. 271 (1950).
The Algonquin certificate did not issue until February 27, 1951, United Gas Pipe Line
Co., F.P.C. Opinion No. 206 (1951), but the majority announced in the November 8th
opinion its intent to grant a certificate to Algonquin. See Tennessee Gas Transmission
Co., supra at 229-300 (Buchanan dissenting in part).
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whole area, two pipelines would be easier to control than one, given that
the problem was not control of competition for customers but that of
ensuring adequate service to all prospective customers in the market
area.42 The market division attempted was started by the grant of a
certificate to one company for service to specific distributor customers
and explicit reservation of others for the second seller.43 It may never
be known, however, whether the dire consequences of duplication adduced
by opponents of "competition" would follow here, for the Commission
certification of the second company was reversed on appeal to the
federal courts, on the ground that a proposal to serve the entire area
by the first company was not given a fair hearing.4 4 Final action by the
FPC is still pending.45
A somewhat clearer picture of the manner in which the competition
issue is met by the Commission's general criteria for certification may be
obtained by analysis of a 1946 case involving a single municipal market,
the Detroit area.46 Up to and through World War II, Panhandle Eastern
Pipeline Company (Panhandle) was the only major natural gas pipeline
system serving the Detroit market. On November 30, 1946, the Commis-
sion issued a certificate to the Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Company
(Michigan-Wisconsin) for the construction of a line from Hansford
County, Texas, to major markets in Michigan and Wisconsin, including
the Detroit-Ann Arbor market already served by Panhandle.47 Two
42. The "cutthroat competition" argument applies with somewhat less force to the
FPC in its control over natural gas pipelines than, for example, to a state commission
controlling gas distributors since, particularly where the market covers a large area,
the attachment of new customers to a pipeline will in most cases necessitate the provi-
sion of facilities for which a Commission certificate will be required. See however,
note 35 supra. To the extent that certification is required, the Commission, rather than
the various forces of the market, has the final word on the allocation of present and
prospective customers between competitors; if it is willing -to take a strong stand it can
undoubtedly nullify any gains which the predatory practices identified with cutthroat
competition might bring to a pipeline company. This does not, however, do away with
the wastes of duplication, which consumers would bear in the form of higher rates.
43. See note 41 supra.
44. Northeastern Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 195 F.2d 872 (3rd Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952). The "proposal" was made in the course of hearings
following the Commission's original call for single project covering the entire New
England territory and was not a formal application for a certificate covering the whole
area. See Northeastern Gas Transmission Co., F.P.C. Opinion No. 208 (1951), which
is a final dismissal of a Northeastern petition for a certificate covering the whole area
filed after the market division had already been started by grant of a limited certificate to
them.
45. The Commission's denial of Algonquin's petition for a temporary certificate
was approved by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Algonquin
Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 201 F.2d 304 (1st Cir. 1953).
Recently the companies reached an agreement dividing the New England market,
but it was subject to FPC approval which had not yet been granted at the time this
note went to press. See Wall Street Journal, July 7, 1953, p. 15, col. 2.
46. The opinion in the case is Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co., 6 F.P.C. 1 (1947).
47. 5 F.P.C. 953 (1946).
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Commissioners, Draper and Olds, dissented from the action of the
majority, which was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia. 48
The FPC decision was based explicitly upon the prediction of a
tremendous increase in demand in the Detroit market and upon the pros-
pect of deliveries to western Michigan markets, whose supply from local
gas fields was failing, and Wisconsin consumers, who had never before
had natural gas service.49 The intent to punish Panhandle for a pattern
of behavior which the majority thought inimical to the public interest,
however, was not hidden.
At root the struggle concerned Panhandle's attitude toward its direct
sales to industrial customers. Such sales were and are not included in
the statutory jurisdiction of the FPC50 and, at the time, there was some
doubt whether state commissions could constitutionally regulate them.51
Panhandle's desire to garner an increasing share of the lush Detroit
industrial market from the local distributing company, Michigan Consoli-
dated Gas Company (Michigan Consolidated), had been quite obvious.52
At the same time it had neither concluded a contract with the distributor
for sufficient increased deliveries nor applied for certification of
facilities adequate to meet the demand forecast by Michigan-Wisconsin
witnesses and accepted for planning purposes by the majority. 53 In the
background lay the post-war winter gas shortages which had led state
48. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 169 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1948). The
1942 amendment, see note 8 supra, specifically provided: "Nothing contained in this
section shall be construed as a limitation upon the power of the Commission to grant
certificates of public convenience and necessity for service of an area already being served
by another natural-gas company." 56 STAT. 84 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f (g) (1946), and
that provision was the final basis on which the court placed its holding. See Panhandle
Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, supra at 883-884; accord, Kentucky Natural Gas Corp.
v. FPC, 169 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1947).
49. See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., supra note 48, at 37, 40.
50. 15 U.S.C. §§717 (b), 717a (6) (1946).
51. The obstacles were the possibility that Congress had so filled the regulatory
field as to exclude state action and the negative implications of the commerce clause. The
issue was finally settled in favor of the state commissions by two cases involving, signi-
ficantly, Panhandle. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Michigan Public Service Comm'n,
341 U.S. 329 (1951) (states may require certificates of public convenience and necessity
as prerequisite to direct sales); Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507 (1947) (state may regulate rates on direct sales).
52. Early in 1946 the Commission had denied Panhandle a certificate for facilities
necessary for direct interruptible sales to the Ford Motor Company in Detroit on the
ground that such service could only be obtained at the expense of service to other in-
terruptible customers who were within the jurisdiction of the FPC. City of Detroit et
al. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 5 F.P.C. 43 (1946). ("Interruptible," as opposed
to "firm" customers, are those whose supply may be curtailed or cut off whenever total
demands exceed the delivery capacity of the seller's system. See FPC, NATURAL GAS
INVESTIGATION [Docket No. G-580], Report of Commissioners Smith and Wimberly 256[1948].)
5,3. See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 6 F.P.C. 1, 30, 31 (1947).
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commissions to restrict space-heating growth throughout the area."4. The
Michigan-Wisconsin line to Detroit undoubtedly appeared to the majority
as a means of bringing needed service and breaking the bargaining jam
created by Panhandle's desire to escape regulation. 55
The duplication issue was met directly with the assertion that the
increase in demand made enlarged physical facilities equivalent to the
Michigan-Wisconsin line necessary in any case, quite aside from the new
markets which would be served in western Michigan and Wisconsin.5"
The increasing demands on other parts of the Panhandle system, more-
over, were such that the company would not be financially harmed by the
loss of prospective markets, 57 while the estimated return for Michigan-
Wisconsin was termed "adequate."55 In sum, the majority thought that
the possibility of ensuing ruinous competition was "... not even remotely
present in this case." 59
The dissenters, apparently unable to make out much of a case as to
duplication on the specific facts before them, contented themselves with
statements about the "inherent" nature of monopoly in public utility in-
dustries in general ° or the natural gas pipeline business in particular.61
It may be added in their favor that there is, some indication that the
adequacy of prospective return to Michigan-Wisconsin rested in part on
spacial price discrimination, i.e., on a shifting of some costs of the
Detroit project to Wisconsin and other non-Detroit consumers, who did
not enjoy the presence of a competing seller.62  The thrust of their
opinions, however, is in another direction.
54. Id. at 28-29.
55. See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 6 F.P.C. 58, 66 (1947) (supplemental
majority opinion); Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 6 F.P.C. 1, 34 (1947).
56. Id. at 28.
57. Id. at 35-37.
58. Id. at 23; cf. note 17 supra, and accompanying text.
59. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 6 F.P.C. 1, 33 (1947). They did, however,
recognize a right on Panhandle's part to share in the Detroit market, and the certificate
to Michigan-Wisconsin was conditioned on the . recognition by that company and
Michigan Consolidated (which was its corporate affiliate) of that right. Id. at 91. The
reader who wishes to follow the tangled course which "regulated competition" between
Panhandle and Michigan-Wisconsin has run, should consult Panhandle Eastern Pipeline
Co. v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 7 F.P.C. 48 (1948) ; Michigan Consolidated Gas
Co. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 9 F.P.C. 998, 1016, 1110, 1288, 1330 (1950);
Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., F.P.C. Opinions Nos. 229, 229-A (1952).
60. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 6 F.P.C. 1, 39 (1947).
61. Id. at 49-50. Commissioner Olds, however, did refer to the benefits of unified
management of storage projects which would be a "duplication" argument analogous to
the contentions of duplication of physical plant. Id. at 49.
62. The rates originally proposed by Michigan-Wisconsin were related to the
volume used per month in a market area divided by its population, id. at 19, which
would seem to give an advantage to highly industrialized regions like Detroit where users
in large volume are to be found. The form proposed was novel, and the majority
refused to approve it without further study. Id. at 20. The problem hung on until 1950,
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Both dissents rely heavily on the adequacy of Panhandle's past
service to Detroit and Michigan Consolidated and its expressed willing-
ness to plan for future expansion . 3 Both emphasize conflict in the record
over the sufficiency of reserves committed to Michigan-Wisconsin, as
well as its inability to meet immediately some of the other minimum re-
quirements. 64 Commissioner Olds, who carried the brunt of the argu-
ment, attributed Panhandle's lag in formal application for authorization
of a substantial increase in facilities to the general shortage of steel pipe
and the uncertainty concerning its future markets to which the Michigan-
Wisconsin application had subjected it since 1944.65 He expressed doubt
concerning the efficacy of competition where Michigan Consolidated, the
distributor buyer, was a corporate affiliate of one of the pipeline sellers,
Michigan-Wisconsin. He felt generally that the Commission was being
rushed into a decision which required much more careful consideration. 6
when the line was ready to go into operation and was then deferred to rate proceedings.
See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 9 F.P.C. 152 (1950), and in particular
Buchanan's dissent, id. at 166-167. A related question concerned the allocation of the
costs of a large storage project at the Michigan terminus of the line. As originally pro-
posed, see Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 6 F.P.C. 1, 9-10 (1947), and as approved
by the Commission, Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 9 F.P.C. 127 (1950), Michigan-
Wisconsin rather than Michigan Consolidated assumed the operation and costs of the
project, with the result that those costs were spread over the entire system, to be paid
in part by Wisconsin and other non-Michigan consumers. Whether its benefits were
correspondingly widely enjoyed is a matter of dispute. See Commissioner Buchanan's
dissent, Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 9 F.P.C. 127, 139 (1950). Allocation of
costs from such projects and spacial price discrimination have continued to plague the
FPC. See Trunkline Gas Supply Co., 8 F.P.C. 250 (1949); Texas Illinois Natural Gas
Pipeline Co., 9 F.P.C. 105 (1950).
63. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 6 F.P.C. 1, 38, 41 et seq. (1947). To the
majority it was "conjectural and misleading," Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 6
F.P.C. 58, 66 .(1947) (supplemental opinion), to rely so heavily on Panhandle's "plans,"
particularly in view of its attitude in the past toward. the Detroit market. They
recognized the adequacy of Panhandle's past service (viewed as fundamental in the
approach of state commissions to the certification of a rival in the market of
an established seller, see BEHLING, op. cit. spra note 8, at 58 and Comment, supra note
20, at 885), by the reservation of a continuing share in the Detroit market for
Panhandle, see note 59 supra. There was a further condition on the certificate that
Panhandle be given the right to a share of future demands in excess of the amounts
contractually supplied Michigan Consolidated by both Panhandle and Michigan-
Wisconsin.
64. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 6 F.P.C. 1, 39, 48 (1947). The other re-
quirements were those as to rates and a showing of firm demands in the Wisconsin
markets. The subsequent history of the case certainly demonstrates that "competition"
of this nature does not necessarily lead in the direction of lower prices. By 1949, it
was clear that upward revision of cost estimates would necessitate rates higher than
those concurrently charged by Panhandle. See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 8
F.P.C. 293 (1949). When the line went into operation in 1950, it was with temporarily
approved rates which were, the Company and the Commission agreed, too high for
permanent charges. See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 9 F.P.C. 152, 163 (1950).
The leniency shown toward Michigan-Wisconsin as to these and the supply requirements
should be compared with that shown to Algonquin. See note 41 supra, and accompany-
ing text.
65. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 6 F.P.C. 1, 41-42 (1947).
66. Id. at 42, 48, 49.
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A crucial aspect of his opinion, in this regard, is its analysis of the
nature of the prospective demand hanging over the Detroit market and
creating the supposed need for swift action by the FPC. It was the
growth of demand beyond the Panhandle system's capacity which allowed
the majority to escape the "duplication of facilities" argument, and that
same expansion of the market was responsible for their ability to punish
Panhandle by awarding the new customers to its rival. Briefly, his objec-
tion was that the Michigan-Wisconsin estimates of future demand con-
tained too large a component devoted to industrial consumption of natural
gas in competition with other fuels.6 7 He did not believe that a new and
competing pipeline to Detroit should be authorized ". . . when the evi-
dence shows clearly that its justification rests not on orderly growth of
the general market but on intensive efforts to expand industrial use
through conversion of large industrial plants, including boiler installa-
tions, to natural gas."
68
The point raised brings into play such factors as the opposition of
coal interests to the entrance of natural gas into Wisconsin markets 9
and transforms the assumptions on which the "competition" problem has
been thus far approached. Both the elasticity of demand for natural
gas and the growth of demand over a period of time are affected sharply
by its competitive relation to other fuels.70 Its industrial market, at least,
is sensitive to movements 'of the business cycle. 7'1 Olds' argument raises
the question whether such relations may be taken as "given" or whether
they, too, present issues for determination by the FPC. To adequately
answer the question, the natural gas market must be set in a broader con-
67. Id. at 47-48. The original Michigan-Wisconsin proposal had been. that it take
over the entire job of supplying Michigan Consolidated after the latter's contract with
Panhandle ran out in 1951. In October of 1946, however, Michigan Consolidated offered
Panhandle a 15 year contract at an annual level somewhat less than its purchases in
1945. It was at this point that Michigan-Wisconsin estimates of industrial demand
jumped, raising the portion of Michigan Consolidated's entire market represented by
industrial load from 30% in 1945, to a prospective 55% in 1952, when projected sales
were to be considerably greater. The majority emphasized the prospects of growth in
space-heating load as the basic element in the demand increase to be expected. See id.
at 29. For a time in 1949, it seemed that Michigan-Wisconsin estimates had overshot
the mark with respect to all classes of demand, see Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co.,
8 F.P.C. 293 (1949), but by 1950, it appeared that they had actually been underestimates,
particularly in regard to space heating. See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 9
F.P.C. 152, 155 (1950); Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., F.P.C. Opinion No. 229-A, at
8-9 (1952).
68. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 6 F.P.C. 1, 48 (1947).
69. Cf. Wisconsin Southern Gas Co., 4 F.P.C. 188 (1944) ; see O'Leary, Ii!troduc-
tion and Utilization of Natural Gas: The Wisconsin Experience, 29 LAND ECONOMICS
13 (1953).
70. See p. 603 infra.
71. See note 124 infra.
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text. In that process problems such as those of conservation policy enter
stage center, after skulking thus far in the wings.
II. The Natural Gas Market: Conservation and Interfuel Competition
A. Prelude
The coal industry, with associated labor and transportation interests,
has been the outstanding competitor of natural gas active in proceedings
before the FPC, though its reception by the Commission was originally
somewhat less than cordial. 72 Initially, coal interests were not allowed to
act as "Interveners" in certificate cases, on the ground that the original
limitation of certificate jurisdiction to markets already served by a natural
gas company indicated a Congressional intent not to vest in the Commis-
sion such broad control of the industry as to justify inclusion of com-
peting fuels' interests in the list of factors significant for purposes of
decision. 73 The FPC's 1940 annual report, taking cognizance of this
problem and its relation to the conservation of gas, asked Congress for
the authority to deal with it. 74 Extension of certificate jurisdiction to all
natural gas pipeline companies in 1942 which was explicitly based, inter
alia, upon the need for consideration of coal and railroad interests7 5
came at an inopportune moment, when the Commission was grappling
with the problem of the decline of natural 'gas production in the Ap-
palachian area.
The original center of discovery and production, the Appalachian
region was facing depletion of its gas reserves immediately due to heavy
use by war industry, but ultimately caused in large part, as the Commis-
sion put it, by early exploitation ". . . under highly competitive condi-
tions. ' ' 76 With the War Production Board calling for more natural gas
service to war industries in the area, the FPC authorized substantial
supplementation of Appalachian supplies with gas from the Southwest. 77
The coal industry's first line of attack was an attempt to persuade the
72. This includes coal producers and distributors, railroads, coke and manufactured
gas producers, and the labor groups associated with, and dependent upon, those indus-
tries. Most prominent have been the National Coal Association and the United Mine
Workers.
73. See Kansas Pipeline and Gas Co., 2 F.P.C. 29, 57 (1939).
74. 20 FPC ANN. REP. 79-80 (1940).
75. H. R. REP. No. 1290, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1942).
76. Hope Natural Gas Co., 4 F.P.C. 59, 65 (1944).
77. The process started with deliveries to the area from the Panhandle system.
See Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 3 F.P.C. 301 (1942). Shortly thereafter the construction of
a major line from Louisiana to West Virginia was authorized. Tennessee Gas and
Transmission Co., 3 F.P.C. 442 (1943), followed by certification of further deliveries
from Panhandle, East Ohio Gas Co., 4 F.P.C. 15 (1943).
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Commission to limit such certificates to the war emergency.73 This the
FPC refused to do, pointing to the liklihood of increased post-war de-
mands and a continuing failure of local supply.7 9 To the argument that
to permit industrial consumption of gas in competition with coal was
to sanction use of a basically limited national resource for inferior pur-
poses the FPC returned that its lack of jurisdiction over both pipeline and
distributor sales to industry indicated that Congress, in directing atten-
tion to the interests of competing fuels, did not intend to endow it
with ". . . complete and comprehensive authority which would permit us
to act as arbiter over the end uses of natural gas."' 0
Early in 1944, however, in the famous Hope Natural Gase case,"'
a dictum of a majority of the Supreme Court bolstered the Commis-
sion's recognition of conservation as a material factor in the issuance of
certificates 2 and Mr. Justice Jackson, in dissent, argued strenously for
consideration of all the factors impinging upon regulation, including the
end-use of gas.83 When further certificates authorizing movement of
Southwestern gas to Appalachian markets were requested, the Commis-
sion referred to "inferior industrial uses such as industrial boiler fuel
for the generation of steam in competition with coal"84 as a cause contri-
buting to exhaustion of reserves in the area and granted certificates only
on the ground that the proposed service was intended mainly for the
use of present domestic, commercial and "high-grade" industrial cus-
tomers and was therefore not in close competition with coal. 5
A slightly different aspect of the problem had been raised by the
desire of certain producing states to conserve their gas for use within
their own borders. The preliminary order in the Memphis Natural Gas
Co. case, which denied a certificate for an increase in facilities carrying
gas from Louisiana to major markets in the Southeast, seemed to indi-
cate that the Commission had commenced to warm toward this position
78. See Ohio Fuel Gas Co., supra note 77, at 305-306 (curiously, though the
opinion seems to reject the coal argument, the certificate was limited to the war emer-
gency) ; Tennessee Gas and Transmission Co., supra note 77, at 446; East Ohio Gas Co.,
supra note 77, at 24.
79. See Ohio Fuel Gas Co., supra note 77, at 305; Tennessee Gas and Transmission
Co., supra note 77, at 447; East Ohio Gas Co., supra note 77, at 24. In the last-named case
the Commission added that ". .. private capital cannot reasonably be expected to embark
on so large an undertaking on the basis of a temporary war-time certificate." Ibid.
80. Tennessee Gas and Transmission Co., 3 F.P.C. 442, 574, 578-579 (1943).
81. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
82. Id. at 612.
83. Id. at 628.
84. Hope Natural Gas Co., 4 F.P.C. 59, 65 (1944).
85. Id. at 66-67. The Commission also thought that the costs of long-distacice
transportation of natural gas from Texas and Louisiana would eliminate it from all but
"superior" industrial markets. Id. at 67.
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as well as that of coal interveners."8 Before final disposition, however,
it announced the institution of a general investigation of the natural gas
industry with special reference to conservation and interfuel competition. 1
On rehearing in the Memphis case, the certificate was granted, and
Louisiana and the coal industry were told that their contentions could be
more appropriately considered within the broad scope of the Natural Gas
Investigation.88  On appeal to the federal courts, the Commission was
upheld, on the ground that conservation was only one of the factors
involved in public convenience and necessity.89 For the next three years
the FPC's certification decisions traveled a zig-zag course on this issue
while the factual background for policy making was being gathered.9 0
86. 4 F.P.C. 608 (1944). Cf. the contention of the State Corporation Commission
of Kansas in Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 4 F.P.C. 263 (1945), that gas should be
conserved for use in the "mid continental" area. The only action asked of the FPC,
however, was a limitation of the certificates to the war emergency, which the Commis-
sion refused.
87. 4 F.P.C. 725 (1944).
88. Memphis Natural Gas Co., 4 F.P.C. 197 (1944). For purposes of simplicity
the Natural Gas Investigation will hereinafter be cited as the NGI. In the Memphis
case, the applicant pipeline company had also made good a supply deficiency which
existed at the time of the first order in the case. Moreover, the Commission noted that
the amount of gas in the project slated for use as boiler fuel had been overestimated and
that the granting of the certificate before it would have small effect upon Louisiana's
reserves of natural gas. Shortly thereafter coal interests opposing the introduction of
natural gas service into southern Wisconsin were told that ". . . benefits to the public
in the area to be served far outweigh the potential losses asserted ... which at best are
highly conjectural." Wisconsin Southern Gas Co., 4 F.P.C. 329, 335 (1945).
89. Department of Conservation v. FPC, 148 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1945). As in the
case of "competition" between two natural gas companies, review of the substantive issues
by the federal courts has been almost nominal. See also, National Coal Association
et al. v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951), for a substantially similar approach to the
merits of the contentions of coal interests.
90. In Tennessee Gas and Transmission Co., 4 F.P.C. 293 (1945), a substantial in-
crease in the capacity of that major line to the Appalachian area was authorized, but
the certificate was limited to the war emergency. Commissioner Olds dissented, id. at
301, mainly on the ground that-with the pressure of the war in Europe gone (the date
of the opinion is June 8, 1945)-a temporary certificate only authorized the building up
of excess capacity which might force the Commission's hand in its decision on whether
to limit post-war expansion in any respect. For a short period thereafter the Commis-
sion swayed again in the direction of coal interests. A certificate granted to the
Northern Natural Gas Company was conditioned on the use of gas as boiler fuel for
electrical generation only for "standby" equipment. See 4 F.P.C. 1099 (1945). But in
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 5 F.P.C. 85 (1946), the Commission returned to
the type of argument used in Wisconsin Southern Gas Co., supra note 89, with the
statement that conservation was only one of the factors in public convenience and neces-
sity and emphasized the predominance of demand for natural gas as a home-heating fuel
in the market to be served. In Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 5 F.P.C. 206 (1946), it
was stated: "In a controversy of this nature it is the public interest which is con-
trolling. The evidence shows conclusively a demand by the consuming public, especially
domestic users, for natural gas rather than oil, wood or coal. It has not been shown by
the interveners that it will be in the public interest to deny such consumers the use of
-natural gas as proposed in this proceeding." Id. at 213. Again, the major distributing
company customer carried a heavy domestic as opposed to industrial load. Finally, in
NOTES
B. Struggle
Inter-industrial competition is no novelty in public utility fields.91
From the economist's point of view it is analogous to "direct" compe-
tition between companies selling the "same" product.92 Regulation aimed
at preserving the "inherent" advantages of each of a group of competing
industries means the avoidance of such competition insofar as possible,
a policy with which there has been experimentation in the transportation
field. 9 3  Such a policy, however, implies a willingness to regulate an
entire sector of the economy; and, while regulation of transportation
has not been carried as far as it might,94 transportation industries as a
whole are much more securely in the public utility category than are their
fuel counterparts. The coal industry has had a checkered career with
respect to government regulation,0" but it is certainly not at present a
public utility. Its claim to protection from natural gas competition, then,
rests in large part upon conservation notions.
At the minimum, conservation has, meant the allocation of certain
national resources, which are so limited in amount that they tend to be
viewed as a national patrimony, between the uses of the present and
those of that future which lies just beyond the vague limits of ordinary
foresight.9 6 Other considerations creep in, of course, for within this
Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 6 F.P.C. 1 (1947), coal interests objecting to the
Wisconsin project were turned off with a reference to the NGI. Id. at 27.
91. See BEHLING, op. cit. supra note 8, c. VII, VIII; Behling, Competitive Signifi-
cance of Substitutes for Public Utility Service, 27 Am. EcoN. REv. 17 (1937).
92. See CHAMBERLAIN, op. cit. sitpra note 29, at 202 n.1, and accompanying text.
There may be "differentiation" of the product on the level of "direct" competition just
as there is on that of inter-industrial competition. In the natural gas industry gas service
from storage projects with greater reliability than service direct from pipelines, is to
some extent a "different" and "superior" product. See Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line
Co., 7 F.P.C. 24, 41 (1948). Again, relative distance from the customer, with the cost
differential to that customer which this may imply, can be a differentiating factor. See
p. 593 supra, and Chamberlin, op. cit. supra note 29, at 260 et seq. In regard to inter-
industrial competition quality differences will be wider, i.e., the range of substitutability
will be narrower. Also there is reason to believe that such differences are more likely
to be functions of technological innovation at the inter-industrial level than at that of
"direct" competition. See BEHLING, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN PUBLIC UTILITY
INuSRmsES 139 (1938); Behling, Competitive Significance of Substitutes for Public
Utility Service, 27 Am. EcoN. REv. 17, 23 (1937).
93. See DEARING AND OwEN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY, Part 11 (1949);
OPPENHE I, THE NATIONAL TRANSPORT POLICY AND INTERCMU1IER COmpEtITIV RATES
(1945).
94. See Williams, The ICC and the Regulation of Intercarrier Competition, 63
HmAv. L. REV. 1349, 1368 (1950).
95. For a review of those portions of its career which most closely approximate
public utility status see Rostow, Bituminous Coal and the Public Interest, 50 YALE LJ.
543 (1941).
96. See, Raushenbush, Conservation in 1952, 281 ANNALS 1 (1952); Beatty, The
Comservation Movement, 281 ANNALS 10 (1952). There is also the matter of obtaining
the largest possible amount of a resource over the entire period for which it may be
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context "waste" can mean practically any use of those resources which
is viewed as less than optimum. At a minimum, again, it is generally
agreed that "physical waste"-action depleting reserves of the resources
without using it to satisfy any human need-is objectionable and should
be eliminated as far as possible.97 Sharp disagreement commences when
various present uses are balanced against one another in the light of
future needs, and the terminology of "economic waste" and "inferior
uses" appears. 98  The fact that other products are available to fulfill
particular functions of the resource in question, i.e., are in competition
with it in those uses, must of course be a powerful factor in attempts to
label such uses "inferior."
The coal industry's case rests on the proposition that theirs is an
aggravated instance of the malfunctioning of competition in a conserva-
tion context. Both coal and its main means of transport, the railroads,
have long been in the class of "sick" or, euphemistically speaking,
"mature" industries.99 Rational conservation thinking about natural gas
implies a recognition of its relation to national fuel needs as a whole.
From this viewpoint it is argued that the overwhelming preponderance
of coal reserves over those of natural gas and oil makes it inevitable
that coal must be relied upon for long-range future fuel supply.100 Pre-
vention of certain uses of gas would postpone the evil day of total deple-
tion of gas reserves and would aid in keeping the coal industry and the
railroads healthy enough to take over fuel supplying when that day
arrives. 1°1 Unrestrained present encroachment by natural gas on coal
markets will, it is claimed, make the future shift back to coal particularly
difficult because of the greater number of men which coal and the rail-
roads employ in comparison to those used by the natural gas industry
in rendering equivalent services. 102 Movement of labor from one job to
another is no easy task, especially in a democratic society. The prospect
available. See Bain, Rostow's Proposals for Petroleum Policy, 57 J. POL. EcoN. 57
(1949); FPC, NGI, Report of Commissioners Smith and Wimberly, 112-113 (1948).
(The NGI reports will hereafter be cited only as SmITH-WIMBERLY and DRAPER-OLDs.)
97. See SMITH-WIMBERLY at 112.
98. See BLACHLY AND OATMAN, NATURAL GAS AND THE PUBUc INTEREST 11, 18,
120 (1947) ; SMITH-WIMBERLY at 113.
99. On the coal industry see Leonard, The Bituminous Coal Industry in THE
STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY (Adams ed. 1950). For a description of the
"maturation" of the railroads see Burns' introduction to HULTGREN, AmERICAN TRANS-
PORTATION IN PROSPERITY AND DEPRESSION (1948).
100. SmITH-WmBERLY at 301, 302 et seq. For an extensive outline of the argu-
ments of both the coal and natural gas industries see BLACHLY AND OATMAN, Op. Cit.
supra. note 98, c. VIII, IX.
101. SMITH-WIMBERLY, loc. cit. supra note 100; BLACHLY AND OATMAN, op. cit.
supra note 98, at 3, 122-125.
102. BLACHLY AND OATMAN, loc. cit. supra note 101.
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of two such moves caps the argument for FPC restriction of the natural
gas industry to its "proper" portion of the national fuel market.1 0 3 Of
the two reports to Congress which emerged from the NGI, one, signed
by Commissioners Smith and Wimberly, took a definite stand against
such control over the end-use of natural gas.'0 4
The first Smith-Wimberly response to the "coal" position is that
the need for conservation of natural gas which, in the argument of coal
interests, was so clear is in reality a much more hazy matter. Factors
which ensure that estimates of oil or natural gas reserves will be subject
to wide margins of error are legion. Add to this the complexities in
determining the amount which can actually be delivered at the well and
the vagaries involved in prediction of future consumption, and judgments
as to the period for which the country can expect to rely upon natural
gas supplies are reduced to their proper status-that of stabs in an en-
veloping twilight.' 0 5 Plunging into this morass of uncertainties, the
Smith-Wimberly report emerged with the conclusions that supplies were
good for at least 25 to 30 years, 10 6 that "reserves are at an all-time
high"'107 and that ". . . prospects of future discovery are excellent."' 08
Those prospects, however, were not for the discovery of the large
"bonanza" fields of the past,' 0 9 and the report predicts an increase in the
costs of exploration and drilling." 0  This aspect of the reserve picture
plus the adherence of Smith and Wimberly to the general proposition
that natural gas is a "wasting asset" induced the further conclusion
that "... increasing emphasis should be placed on waste prevention
"111
The "waste" which concerns the Smith-Wimberly report, however,
is mainly "physical waste.""12 To the extent that such waste is con-
103. Ibid.
104. SMITH-WIMBERLY at 29. The Smith-Wimberly argument outlined below is
one derived from the report submitted to Congress, which is not organized as a polemic
against any particular point of view. Consequently, matters of emphasis within that
argument are largely guesses of the writer, for which Commissioners Smith and
Wimberly should not necessarily be held responsible.
105. Id. at 41-44, 46.
106. Id. at 45-46.
107. Id. at 59.
108. Ibid. The need for conservation, in the eyes of Smith and Wimberly, is
further blunted by prospects of producing a satisfactory substitute from coal. See id.
at 412 and Part X, "Prospects for the Production of a Substitute for Natural Gas."
The possible impact of atomic energy also reduces somewhat the need for conservation
of natural gas, but developments in that field are too speculative to act as factors for
conservation planning. See SmlTH-Wmnmy at 303-305.
109. Id. at 3941.
110. Id. at 53.
111. Id. at 59.
112. See id. at 112-117 and Part IIl, "State Conservation Laws and Activities,"
generally.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
sidered the major conservation problem, action by federal agencies can
only be supplementary to state controls upon which the burden of regu-
lation would fall. 113 Federal action is consequently given scant attention
in the conservation sections of the Smith-Wimberly report.1 14 The asser-
tion that "inferior use" constitutes "waste" is carefully attributed to
"some" people. 15
It would seem that such emphasis on "physical waste" to the exclu-
sion of broader considerations was, to some degree, misplaced. Such
waste can be and has been reduced considerably, mainly through strong
state action.116 Surely the reciprocal of the Smith-Wimberly position
also holds, i.e., to the extent that "physical waste" disappears as a major
conservation problem the issues of "economic waste" must heave into
view. 17 The division of the market into "inferior" and "superior" uses,
which those issues embrace, is the one on which the coal industry would
rely for its protection from natural gas competition.
If the relative market prices of various uses of natural gas are
reliable indices of the valuations which most people place upon those
uses, then the general category of industrial uses is that segment of
the market in which the "inferior" functions of natural gas will be
found. 118 Such relative prices are more likely to measure the "closeness"
with which other fuels, coal in particular, compete with gas in terms of
quality and reliability. Even so, there is good conservation sense in the
coal industry's position that where coal is a close substitute for natural
gas, the corresponding function of gas is an "inferior" one. In the NGI
hearings, coal interests claimed such substitutability over broad ranges
of the fuel market." 9
113. Id. at 121-122, 141-144. The Commission had already noted the importance of
encouraging pipelines to carry gas produced in association with oil, see El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 5 F.P.C. 115 (1946), which presents the greatest problem of physical waste.
See SMITH-WIMBERLY at 116. This note does not attempt to cover specific problems of
physical waste and solutions to them which have been proposed or adopted. For exten-
sive analyses see SMITH-WIMBERLY Part III; Williams, Conservation of Oil and Gas,
65 NARV. L. REV. 1155 (1952).
114. SMITH-WIMBERLY at 116.
115. See id. at 112, 113.
116. STOCKTON, HENSHAW AND GRAVES, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL GAS IN TEXAS
232-235 (1952).
117. This contention holds, of course, only if one grants that natural gas is a
limited and wasting resource.
118. SMITH-WIMBERLEY at 395. That price is not the only index of inferior use,
however, is indicated by the fact that there has been no attempt to label the non-fuel
use of natural gas in the production of chemical synthetics "inferior." See, e.g., DRAPER-
OLDs at 43; BLACHLY AND OATMAN, op. cit. supra note 98, at 120; SMITH-WIMBERLY.
Part IX. Such use is, of course, highly localized near producing fields and so beyond
the jurisdiction of the FPC, for the most part. Cf. note 122 infra.
119. SMITH-WIMBERLY at 301.
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In any extreme form this contention can hardly hold up. There
are dozens of specialized industrial processes in which the flexibility of
temperature control that gas as a fuel allows is essential.120  Even in
relatively non-specialized uses, such as industrial space-heating, natural
gas superiority in cleanliness and ease of delivery and handling make it
a premium fuel. 12  In practice, the category on which the coal industry
has concentrated, and as to which the qualitative equality of coal and
natural gas is least often open to dispute, is consumption for boiler fuel.122
The major explanation advanced by Smith and Wimberly for the
ability of natural gas to take industrial fuel markets away from coal is
the stability of regulated natural gas prices during a period of sharply
rising and unregulated coal prices. 123 It is curious, in this regard, that
neither report in the NGI discusses the possibility that natural gas sellers
were able to compete with coal in such uses only by adopting discrimina-
tory pricing tactics, i.e., by shifting most of their costs to domestic and
commercial consumers, for whom coal and other fuels were not close
substitutes for natural gas. 124 Definition and measurement of discrimina-
120. Id. at 337, 389-390.
121. Id. at 349; BLACHLY AND OAT AN, op. cit. supra note 98, at 17.
122. See id. at 120, and p. 601 supra. But see SMITH-WIABEmLY at 346-349. The
manufacture of carbon black from natural gas has also often been placed in the sphere
of "inferior" uses, see id. at 112-113, 371, but-as such manufacture is localized almost
completely near producing fields in the Southwest and is not significantly associated with
interstate movement of natural gas-it is a problem for state rather than federal regu-
lation. Id. at 365. Smith and Wimberly also emphasized the similar localization of use
for boiler fuel and industrial purposes generally. Id. at 327-328, 352, 356-357, 383, 407-
409, as part of a picture in which interstate movement of gas plays a more limited
role in the depletion of gas reserves than coal interests' strictures might suggest. Carbon
black manufacture, of course, is not in competition with coal and the high cost of
transporting coal from Appalachian and Midwestern coal fields effectively eliminates coal
as an industrial fuel in the Southwest. See id. at 326, 328. But the localization argument
can be pushed too far. In the period covered by the report the large metropolitan
centers of the eastern seaboard were not served by natural gas, as they have been
since. See p. 614 infra. The fact that the volume of natural gas moving in interstate
commerce approximately doubled between 1945 and 1949, must give one pause before
relying too heavily on localization of use in 1945 as a basis for deprecating the argument
that the FPC bears substantial responsibility for the amount of gas used as boiler fuel.
See 31 FPC ANN. REP. 19 (1951).
123. S[ITH-WIMBERLY at 331 et seq. See, however, id. at 269, for an acknowledge-
ment of the problem.
124. Note that the function of price discrimination in interfuel competition is
directly analogous to its role in competition within the natural gas pipeline industry.
To the extent present, it allows sellers to meet competitive prices in one sphere of their
market at the expense of consumers in the non-competitive spheres. See note 62 supra,
and accompanying text. It is significant in this regard that, although industrial uses
account for the greatest volume of natural gas consumption, they provide comparatively
little revenue for pipeline companies. See 32 FPC ANN. REP. 16, 17 (1952). Such sales
also fluctuate considerably with the business cycle, creating a long-run problem of excess
capacity analogous to that induced annually by space-heating loads. See SMITH-WIMBEmBY
at 256-257, 362.
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tion are admittedly not easy, 125 and Commissioners Smith and Wimberly
may have been of the opinion that the general upward movement of coal
prices was a much more significant factor than discrimination. But
such practices were assigned stellar importance with respect to inter-
industrial competition in public utility fields by the foremost general
study of the phenomenon,' 2 6 and a leading student of public utility
economics charged, about the time of the issuance of the NGI reports,
that price discrimination was largely responsible for the growth of
natural gas space-heating markets. 127 The structure of final rates to con-
sumers is a matter beyond the statutory jurisdiction of the FPC, but
this is surely irrelevant- to the wide questions posed by the NGI with
respect to the entire scope of governmental regulation of natural gas.
The argument made by the pipeline companies in support of their
industrial sales in general and boiler fuel sales in particular relates to the
economic peculiarities of long-distance pipeline transportation. The
necessity to build capacity sufficient to meet peak demands means that
increase of sales volume in off-peak periods will decrease unit costs so
much as to make the low pricing of such sales profitable, particularly as
the natural gas space-heating market, with its extreme winter highs and
summer lows, expands. 128  The effect of such fluctuations in demand
upon costs is analyzed in detail in the Smith-Wimberly report, with the
conclusion that the argument has been considerably overdone. 129 In addi-
tion, storage facilities in combination with smaller line capacity, long a
feature of many pipeline systems in the Appalachian area, are often an
effective alternative to the large line capacity which "necessitates" indus-
trial sales'130
125. See TROXEL, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES C. 24, 25, 26 (1947).
126. BEHLING, MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION IN PUBLIC UTIIr INDUSTRIES C. VII,
VIII (1938). Also see Behling, Competitive Significance of Substitutes for Public Utility
Service, 27 Am. Ecow. REv. 17, 25, 30 (1937) ; McGray, Consumer Classes and Price of
Gas Utilities, 29 NORTH DAKOTA L. REv. 5 (1953). The absence of explicit discussion
of price discrimination is made even more puzzling by the fact that Dr. Behling was
the general director of the investigation for the FPC. See SmiTH-WmBEMLY at 3. See
also Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 628
(1944), for a discussion of the impact of discriminatory pricing on interfuel competition.
The Smith-Wimberly report does take cognizance of the effect of rate-making on the
growth of demand for natural gas, but only to suggest that rate-makers recognize and
encourage measures to meet peak demands. See SMITH-WIMBERY at 352-353.
127. Troxel, Price Discrimination in Space Heating, 24 LAND ECONOMICS 281
(1948).
128. SmITH-WmBERLY at 254-257.
129. Id. at 258-273.
130. For this and other alternatives to interruptible sales as ways of meeting the
problem of seasonal peaks, see id. at 273-291.
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On balance it is clear, and the Smith-Wimberly report agrees,1' 1
that there is a sound case for some attempt to get natural gas out of the
boiler fuel market where coal is available. But the vagueness in the need
for conservation, in the eyes of these Commissioners, and the idea that
evaluation of a product's uses is not the province of a governmental com-
mission keep them from endorsing end-use control.'3 2  Emphasizing
possibilities in the development of new techniques of coal production and
utilization, they insist that the fate of the coal industry must depend
mainly on its own efforts.' 33 The policy they urge upon the natural gas
industry is more concenfration upon firm industrial service of a "superior"
quality.'34
Commissioners Olds and Draper had fewer qualms as to the role
of the FPC as a national planning commission. Their report takes its
majot stand 3 5 on an issue not covered explicitly by the Smith-Wimberly
report, the question of conservation planning not only from the viewpoint
of the country as an abstract unit but also at the level and in the interests
of the various regions. This introduces a considerable change in the
significance attributed to conservation problems. The importance given
the complexities involved in estimation of natural gas reserves drops
away before the reasonable certainty that supply is limited to a relatively
131. "A general shift from interruptible to firm industrial gas service is necessary
if the full usefulness and premium value of gas for industrial purposes is to be realized."
Id. at 293. It is somewhat difficult to tell whether Smith and Wimberly would endorse
year-round "firm" boiler fuel sales, but they include in the shift from interruptible to
firm service an "upgrading and "repricing" of industrial sales which would almost
certainly take natural gas out of the boiler fuel market in many instances. Ibid. The
allocation of gas between interruptible customers in various localities during the recur-
rent post-war winter shortages (and the attendant cries of "discrimination" from those
who felt unfairly treated, see Hearings, supra note 5, at 177 et seq.) also provided a potent
pressure against the handling of peak demand problems through interruptible sales. See
SMITH-WIMBERLY at 269-273.
132. "There is a need for the interstate pipe lines and local distributors supplied by
them to reconsider their marketing policies with respect to sales of industrial gas. This
can and should be accomplished in economic terms of price and service, rather than by
imposition of some kind of arbitrary determinations as to 'proper' uses of natural gas
in comparison with other fuels." Id. at 24.
133. Id. at 320, 353. The identification of competition with technological progress
at the level of inter-industrial competition may be more valid than at the level of the
firm. Compare notes 29, 92 supra. To the extent of that validity there is a strong argu-
ment against governmental protection of the coal industry.
134. See note 132 supra.
135. Olds and Draper also argue that the possibility of producing gasoline from
natural gas makes strong conservation measures particularly desirable in the interests of
national defense since oil imports from abroad may be cut off. See DRAPER-Ozns,
Section V. The Smith-Wimberly reply is that such prospects for natural gas are but
slightly more advanced than those for coal and oil shale; that natural gas reserves
would not support substantial supplementation of petroleum supplies so that the basic
reliance for such purposes must be on coal and ol1 shale. SMITH-WIMBERLy at 431.
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short period-even if this should prove to-be as much as sixty years. 13 6
The aggregate figures for the country, moreover, do not reflect the shift
from area to area which profoundly affects the natural gas industry and
the regions involved. 1 37 The interests of those regions differ, according
to Olds and Draper, in three directions.
The great producing states of the Southwest have no coal reserves
and little water power. They require gas, it is said, for industrializa-
tion. 3 " While particular emphasis is given the problem of absorption of
farm labor unemployed by the increasing mechanization of agriculture
throughout the South,13 9 the report clearly conceives of such industriali-
zation as part of an overall program of "balanced" regional develop-
ment. 140  It is probable that such states cannot regulate exportation of
natural gas in order to save it for themselves without conflicting with
the commerce clause of the federal constitution.14' Consuming states
without indigenous fuel reserves, such as Minnesota, naturally have an
interest in the conservation of supplies of efficient low-cost fuels like
natural gas. The Olds-Draper position, in line with their general ideal
of industrial decentralization, 42 is that gas is peculiarly necessary to
these states as a lure for industry. Lastly, the burning of natural gas as
boiler fuel in centers of coal production such as the Appalachian and
Midwest regions is particularly to be deplored.' 43 Olds and Draper advo-
cate "definite but flexible" control of end-use via certification with a par-
ticular view to regional planning.1 44
That the regional development issue is a fundamental one for future
national development is undeniable, but there is also no question that the
136. DRAPER-OLDs at 24-25. See Section II of that report in general. Taking the
interests of "regions" seriously also changes the significance of the prospects for pro-
duction of a substitute for natural gas from coal. The Southwestern states, for instance,
would be on the long end of transportation costs for gas fuels produced near coal
reserves. See id., Section III.
137. See id. at 22, and Sections IV and VI, generally.
138. See id., Section IV.
139. Id. at 64; see Huitt, Federal Regulation of the Uses of Natural Gas, 46 Aii.
PoL. Sci. REv. 455 (1952).
140. DRAPER-OLDs at 33 and Section VIII, "Public Interest of the Consuming
Areas."
141. See id. at 70-73; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923). Aside
from the constitutional question, Draper and Olds thought that the multiplicity of pro-
ducing and consuming states would make state attempts to regulate extra-state end-use a
source of "utter confusion." DRAPER-OLDs at 73.
142. Id. at 85-98.
143. Id. at 98-111.
144. Id. at 12-13. A heavy emphasis is also placed upon the development of storage
projects in the Midwest, Appalachian and Eastern Seaboard regions, as an alternative to
boiler fuel sales. See id. at 13, 105, 109, 116.
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policy advocated is one concerning which there is nothing approaching
general agreement. To officials of the state of Tennessee, Louisiana's
attempt to conserve gas for itself was "discrimination"' 145 and at least
one student of world resources conservation considers the Olds-Draper
regional development ideal a particularistic barrier to healthy national
growth.14  The problem is entirely too broad for evaluation here, but it
should be noted that there is no indication that Congress ever contem-
plated such a function for the FPC.1 4T  Granting that such basic policy
decisions are for Congress to make, there is little disparagement of the
merits of the Olds-Draper argument in the conclusion that they asked for
Commission action not justified by the statutory base of regulation.' In
the absence of legislative discussion, the failure of governmental respon-
sibility in the tacit decision against them is Congressional.
In addition to certification problems the NGI dealt with FPC juris-
diction over "independent" producers of natural gas and with the question
of standards for the valuation of pipeline-owned producing and gathering
properties. 4 8 The issues raised in this regard relate to conservation and
interfuel competition in two significant respects. The first is the oft-
discussed discontent with low natural gas field prices.' 49 Many have
argued for field price increase as a conservation measure aimed at both
physical and economic waste.150 The uses of such an increase as an aid
145. See Memphis Natural Gas Co., 4 F.P.C. 197, 208-209 (1944).
146. ZIMMERMAN, WORLD RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIES 564-565 (1951). The Na-
tional Resources Committee, hardly a tool in the hands of oil and gas interests, did not
find the issues of "balanced" regional development versus an integrated national planning
unit an easy one to resolve. See NATIONAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE, REGIONAL FACTORS
IN NATIONAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 156 et seq. (1935).
147. See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 609-615 (1944)., Mr. Justice
Jackson's arguments, id. at 637-639, run from the Commission's authorization to deal with
price discrimination between industrial and other consumers and hence prove only the
Commission's ability to consider end-use of natural gas in general. But the position of
West Virginia in that case and of the Draper-Olds report goes beyond the end-use con-
siderations which national conservation or interfuel competition require. While attention
is restricted to the Appalachian region and the Southwest, the fact that transportation
costs substantially eliminate coal from Southwestern fuel markets reduces the coal argu-
ment to opposition to boiler fuel use in the Appalachian states--exactly the position at
which Olds and Draper arrive. But they also arrive at the notion that each region's need
for natural gas as an industrial fuel must be viewed on its own merits, which depend
largely upon the availability of alternative fuels. DRAI'ER-OLDs at 116. Areas without
indigenous fuel resources present a claim for industrial use of natural gas which the
coal industry would hardly favor, though Draper and Olds almost certainly would. Ibid.
148. See SMITH-WIMBERLY, Parts IV, V; DRAPER-OLDs, Sections IX, X.
149. See BLACHLY AND OATMAN, op. cit. supra note 98, at 37, 96, 134; Holloway,
State Regulation of Minimum Field Gas Prices, 4 OKLA. L. REv. 69 (1951); SMITH-
WIMBERLY at 175.
150. See BLACHLY AND OATMAN, op. cit. supra note 98, at 148-149; SMITH-
WIMBERLY at 176-177. Coal interests joined the natural gas industry in advocating
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to the elimination of physical waste are usually undisputed, 151 but in the
broader context it is by no means a predictable tool. The Olds-Draper
report is against such indirect action and for direct conservation control
through the certification process, arguing for protection of consumers-
especially industrial consumers in regions such as the Southwest. 15 2
Aside from this, as has been noted in connection with oil conservation,
the raising of price at points of production in order to eliminate "low-
valued" uses is likely to run into discriminatory practices on the part of
distributors, which shift the weight of the increase to consumers for
"superior" purposes.153 The validity of the Olds-Draper regional develop-
ment ideal is subject to dispute, of course, and the extent of discrimina-
tion uncertain, but a minimal conclusion is that control of end-use via the
field price variable is of equivocal value as an addition or alternative to
control through the certificate device, so long as the structure of prices
to ultimate consumers is undetermined.
Reference to oil conservation illuminates the second and more general
relation between interfuel competition and other aspects of the NGI. A
basic contention of oil and gas interests has been that production and
gathering of natural gas are so uncertain and risky as not to be "public
utility functions.'1 54 It follows, along these lines, that "independents"
should not be regulated and pipeline producers should receive "fair
market value" rather than "cost" for the gas they produce. The question
arises as to why industrial sales, fluctuating with the business cycle and
in keen competition with other fuels, should be considered "utility func-
tions." Why should functions other than transportation, such as the
sale of gas, be included in the regulated sector of the industry in the
first instance? Broadly stated, why are the pipelines not common carriers,
as are most oil pipelines, 55 and why should they not be divorced from
higher field prices for natural gas. See id. at 301-302. Some would have the FPC handle
these raises, see BLACHLY AND OATMAN, supra. Others would leave it to state commis-
sions. See Holloway, supra note 149. The FPC could not control rates for direct or
indirect industrial sales without amendment of the NGA. See 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1946) ;
31 FPC ANN. REP. 144 (1951) ; note 50 supra and appended text. It has been suggested
that, by use of price discrimination favoring regions such as the Southwest, rate control
can be used to implement Olds-Draper ideals. See Comment, 59 YALE LJ. 1468, 1510
(1950). Such use of rate controls would be limited to agencies of the federal government,
since there is little reason to distinguish the constitutionality significant effects of such
price discrimination upon interstate commerce from those of direct state prohibitions upon
the export of natural resources. Cf. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
151. SMITH-WIMBERLY at 190-191. But see DRAPER-OLDs at 123-131.
152. DRAPER-OLDs at 150-157.
153. See Rostow, A Reply, 57 J. POL. EcoN. 60, 62 (1949) ; DRAPER-OLDs at 152-154;
BLACHLY AND OATmAN, op. cit. supra note 98, at 159.
154. SMITH-WimBERILv at 206-209, and see note 5 supra.
155. See Wolbert, The Pipe Line Story, 4 OK.. L. Ray. 1, 199, 335, 445 (1951).
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both production and distribution, as has been advocated for their oil
analogues ?156
The answers are, in part, historical. Manufactured gas distributors,
traditionally utilities, have always played an important part in developing
long-distance natural gas pipelines..' 7 The NGA itself was passed largely
to aid state and local regulation of utilities whose affiliate pipeline com-
panies were beyond control. 158 More basically, the answers may be
found in the proposition that seams in the web of our economy are not
always easy to find. The decision placing the gas industry in the public
utility category is taken at the level of the ultimate consumer. He requires
protection where it is generally agreed that the best organization of gas
transportation and distribution facilities leaves them in the-hands of one
or, at most, a few sellers per market, as opposed to the consumer of oil
products who faces a much larger array of distributors.'59 If that deci-
sion is sound, then there is good sense in the refusal to attempt general
divorcement of producing facilities and pipeline owners on the grounds
that the pipelines do not have the incentives to quick exploitation of gas
reserves characteristic of the independent owner and that, with the
market for gas in the field rapidly shifting to a "seller's market," the
pipelines are in need of a bargaining weapon. 160 That good sense is the
protection of consumers, both as to price and reliability of supply.
Much the same kind of argument applies to the question of natural
gas industrial sales. Conservation links the interest of the consumer and
competing fuels. The Smith-Wimberly refusal to take more than nominal
action toward differentiating the functions of coal and natural gas in
industrial markets is made feasible by the uncertainties in the growth
of natural gas reserves and the technological development of the coal
156. See RosTow, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL INDUSaRY (1948); but see
Wolbert, supra note 155, at 224-255.
157. See BLACHLY AND OATMAN, op. cit. supra note 98, c. V; REPORT ON NATURAL
GAS AND NATuRAL GAS PIPELINES (TNEC Monograph -36, 1940).
158. See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944). See also TRoxEL,
EcoNomIcs OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 95 et seq. (1947).
159. It is not suggested that the "natural monopoly" criterion is a sufficient one to
distinguish public utility industries from those to which anti-trust action rather than
regulation would be applicable. See BARNES, THE ECONOmiCS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGU-
LATiox c. I (1942); TROXEL, ECONOmiCS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES c. 1, 2 (1947). It is the
existence of such monopolies in markets where they sell directly to ultimatt consumers
which distinguishes the natural gas industry from the oil industry. See TRoxmL, supra
at 46-48; Symposium: Presering Competition Versus Regulating Monopoly, 30 Am.
EcoN. Rxv. 164-218 (Supp. 1940) ; Wolbert, supra note 155.
160. See SMITH-WmBERLY at 142-143, 212-213. A similar argument applies to the
relation of pipelines to distributing companies. See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co.,
6 F.P.C. 1, 34 (1947). If these arguments are granted, the notion of a pipeline as a
common carrier is superfluous.
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industry. A sharp dip in the ratio of gas reserves to annual demand,
for instance, would render much of their argument nugatory.
C. Aftermath
The breadth and complexity of the issues covered by the NGI en-
sured that resolutions following upon it would not be clear-cut dramatic
finales. Certain FPC tendencies, however, can be perceived by reference
to the background of information and conflict which the investigation
represents. In 1947 and 1948 the Commission issued certificates for two
new major systems carrying gas from the Southwestern to the Ap-
plachian, Midwest, and Eastern Seaboard regions, without any attempt
to restrict the functions for which gas could be used.'' It was bolstered
in such action by the boom on the natural gas space-heating market
Shortages, particularly on the Panhandle system, required imposition of
emergency rules for the allocation of available gas during winters from
,1945 through 1948, with the net effect of making the finding of demand
for new lines in certificate proceedings a more or less foregone conclu-
sion.' 62  Natural gas quality was and is the main attraction in space-
heating markets, so that there was little chance to label such use "in-
ferior." Coal interests were reduced to arguing the effects of displace-
ment, which were not immediately striking.G63
At the same time, the Commission placed a heavy emphasis on the
development of storage projects, a point upon which both reports in the
NGI had agreed.164 The position of such pools as an alternative to inter-
ruptible boiler fuel sales has been consistently maintained and, since
1948, increasingly pushed.' 65 Still, during 1947 and 1948 the inceritives
toward federal conservation action were not strong. Despite increased
withdrawals, Southwestern known reserves were still growing at a faster
rate than demand. 66
In 1949 the large increases in natural gas consumption began to tell
on the reserve-annual demand ratio, which has since continued to move
161. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 6 F.P.C. 148 (1947); Transcontinental
Gas Pipe Line Co., 7 F.P.C. 24 (1948).
162. See, e.g., Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 6 F.P.C. 137, 196 (1947). The
Smith-Wimberly report considered such shortages ". .. the foremost problem confront-
ing both the natural- and manufactured-gas industries." SMITH-WIMERLY at 411.
163. See Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 7 F.P.C. 24, 42-44 (1948). The major
fuel replaced was fuel oil rather than coal and there was at the time an oil shortage.
Ibid.
164. See Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., supra note 163, at 39 et seq., and see
note 144 and p. 608 supra.
165. See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 9 F.P.C. 32, 47-55 (1950); see
also 32 FPC ANN. REP. 77-78 (1952).
166. See 28 FPC ANN. REP. 12 (1948) ; 29 FPC ANN. REP. 14 (1949).
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downward.167 The first effect of this movement was a conflict over the
supply requirement for certificates.' 68 While there had been no set
number of years for which a showing of adequate supply had been
necessary, the 20-year period had been common. There was a consensus
on the Commission that a flat insistence upon a showing of a 20-year
supply at the time of application would be arbitrary, but Commissioner
Olds was much less disposed to be content with a minimal showing of
possibilities of future purchases than were his fellow commissioners.
With the limits in the growth of reserves in Kansas and Louisiana in
sight, he foresaw increasing competition among large pipeline purchasers
for Texas gas, with price rises seriously affecting Southwestern industries
as well as consumers in other areas. His views did not prevail, but the
increased attention to the limits of supply and physical deliverability
manifest in Commission opinions since the NGI, has been particularly
accentuated since 1949.169
With the future of gas reserves constricting, the end-use issue could
hardly be considered dead. Early in 1950, when two applications to serve
the Tidewater area of Virginia conflicted in the Commonwealth case, a
partial basis for the choice of the successful company was its agreement
to reduce boiler fuel sales to a minimum, while its rival would have de-
pended largely upon such sales to one customer. '0 The following year
the TVA failed to convince the Commission that natural gas, rather
than coal, was necessary for use as boiler fuel in a new electric power
generating plant, with the result that an entire Texas Gas Transmission
Corporation project fell through.1 1 In both cases there was a definite
showing of the projected displacement of substantial amounts of coal, and
the opinion in the earlier case took pains to declare that such displacement
would not ". . . be determinative of the question of whether or not a
certificate should issue in a proceeding where consideration of the broad
public interest-the interest of all potential consumers, the public welfare
or national defense-outweigh the adverse effect that natural gas service
167. See 30 FPC ANN. Rap. 13 (1950); 31 FPC ANN. REP. 20 (1951); 32 FPC
ANN. REv. 19 (1952). This does not mean that the total amount of reserves has been
decreasing, but that consumption has grown more quickly.
168. See Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 8 F.P.C. 190 (1949).
169. See 30 FPC ANN. REP. 80-82 (1950).
170. Commonwealth Natural Gas Corp., 9 F.P.C. 70 (1950).
171. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., F.P.C. Opinion No. 220 (1951). Earlier the
same year the Commission refused to allow Texas Eastern Transmission Company to
make boiler fuel sales to an electric utility company in New Jersey. United Gas Pipe
Line Co., F.P.C. Opinion No. 206, at 27-28 (1951). The Commission's annual report for
1951 recommends that explicit statutory authority to control end-use be given it. 31 FPC
ANN. REP. 145 (1951).
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might have on competitive fuels.' 172 An illustration of the principle was
provided late in 1951, when coal interests failed to prevent authorization
of the importation of natural gas from Canada. The displacement in-
volved, in the opinion of the FPC, was much more likely to be of fuel oil
than of coal, and the plant affected was a copper refinery considered vital
to national defense.
1 7 8
Other contexts of such cases undoubtedly have a great deal to do with
the success or failure of coal interveners. The action they can ask from
the FPC is limited to denial of certificates on the ground that too large a
component of the prospective market would be devoted to inferior uses or,
perhaps, the conditioning of certificates to require that direct sales to in-
dustry for boiler fuel not be made. A denial can take place much more
easily where there is an alternative seller before the Commission whose
service would not have the objectionable features of its rival's plan, as in
the Commonwealth case,17 4 or where a failure to meet other minimum re-
quirements gives a stronger basis for the refusal of the certificate.1'15
Given such limitations, it is clear that, if coal competitors of natural gas
can show definite displacement of coal in boiler fuel use, they will get a
sympathetic hearing. Although pre-emption of supply for the boiler fuel
market is undoubtedly a minimal goal to them, it is unlikely that the Com-
mission will be moved to label other functions of natural gas "inferior"
unless there should be a disastrous drop in reserves or deliverability. The
coal industry's arguments relate to long-run conditions of a comparatively
uncertain nature, and-subject to the unknown impact of atomic energy
-long-run prospects for coal seem bright. Of at least equal importance
is the ticklish problem which commission apportionment of natural gas
to various uses poses for anyone who takes "consumer sovereignty"
seriously.
It should be noted, finally, that the regional development issue is not
completely moribund. In the bitter struggle over extension of natural gas
service to New England it was, surprisingly, Commissioner Wimberly
who adverted to the fears of producing states that their prime resource
was being sold out from under them.' 76 If Kansas and Louisiana sup-
plies commence to decline sharply, a long over-due Congressional discus-
sion of the problem which Draper and Olds considered so significant may
perhaps be expected.
172. Commonwealth Natural Gas Corp., 9 F.P.C. 70, 90 (1950).
173. Montana Power Co., F.P.C. Opinion No. 223 (1952).
174. Commonwealth Natural Gas Corp., 9 F.P.C. 70 (1950).
175. In the Commonwealth case, supra note 174, the applicant denied a certificate
did not adequately meet the supply requirement, nor did the Texas Gas Transmission
Corp., F.P.C. Opinion 220 (1951) See also Mississippi River Fuel Corp., F.P.C.
Opinion No. 250 (1953).
176, United Gas Pipe Line Co., F.P.C. Opinion No. 206, at 6 of his opinion.
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III. Natural Gas Certification and the Bmsiness Cycle
Certificate problems relate to overall business fluctuations as both
causes and effects. The FPC's concern with the effect which cyclical
swings in national income and employment may have upon the natural
gas industry is manifest in its approach to the financing requirement. The
incentives leading to extensive debt financing are well-known, and the.
dangers flowing from too small a proportion of risk capital equally
clear.17 7  Such dangers would be multiplied if a rescission in business
activity were to hit the industrial market for gas. The comparative
stability of gas and electric utilities, however, has enabled them to main-
tain an extraordinarily high ratio of debt to equity financing., 7 The
sharp post-war expansion found them in need of large external sources of
capital. 179
The Commission initially refused to control the extent of debt
financing 80 but in 1950 it evolved a general rule for the financing of
projects subject to certification governing the level to which it would allow
the proportion of risk capital to sink.' 8 ' Although its authority to enter
so far into the financial structure of natural gas companies has been
challenged on grounds of lack of specific statutory authorization,18 2
177. Among incentives most prominent would seem to be the desire to get "stock
leverage," i.e., to concentrate control of the corporation involved in the hands of a few
people, both for the sake of the power itself and the relatively greater return falling to
common stock-holders where the overall return on capital is limited by public utility
regulation. See Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce on HR. 5306, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 19 (1950). As to the
dangers, briefly, the greater the amount of financing which will require the company to
meet fixed charges, the weaker its financial structure. See FINANCING UTILrIY CAPITA.
REQUIREMENTS 9 (American Gas Institute and Edison Electric Institute, 1949); STUDY
OF LEGAL R1SERVE LIFE INSURANcE CO MPANIES 370-378 (TNEC Monograph 28, 1941);
Cf. LOCKLiN, ECONoMrcs OF TRANSPORTATION 592 et seq. (3rd ed. 1951). The incentives
to debt financing are made greater by the preference of institutional investors, particu-
larly life insurance companies, for such supposedly safer investments. See FINANCING
UTILITY CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS, supra at 13-14; STUDY OF LEGAL RESERv LIFE IxsuR-
ANCE COMPANIES, supra at 37, and supplemental Monograph 28-A; Hearings, supra,
loc. cit. The TNEC study, supra, came to the conclusion that such conserva'tism on the
part of institutional investors was a "drag" on the economy in general. But see Guthman,
Institutional Investment and the Problem of Equity Financing, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
172 (1952).
178. FINANCING UTILITY CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 15, 47 (American Gas Institute
and Edison Electric Institute, 1949).
179. Id. at 9, 12, 18.
180. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 8 F.P.C. 190 (1949).
181. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 9 F.P.C. 32 (1950); San Juan Pipe
Line Co., 9 F.P.C. 170 (1950). See also East Tennessee Natural Gas Co., F.P.C. Opinion
No. 240 (1952); Permian Basin Pipeline Co., F.P.C. Opinion No. 249 (1953).
182. Commissioners Smith, concurring in Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 8 F.P.C.
190 (1949), at 204-207, and Draper, dissenting in San Juan Pipe Line Co., supra note
181, at 193, both take this position.
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there is definite warrant in the legislative history of the 1942 amendment
for the FPC's action.'8 3 It is one of the essential features of public utility
regulation that the balance between arbitrary interference with manage-
ment and proper regulatory action is always a delicate one. There is no
indication that the Commission has abused the power it has assumed in
this regard.
The significance of certification as a causal influence on the cycle lies
in its control over investment by the natural gas industry. 8 4 The Com-
mission might try to "plan" natural gas investment, attempting to
stimulate it during depressions and controlling its rate in inflationary
periods. 8 5 While the FPC has not indicated in certificate proceedings
cognizance of the relation between its actions and this broad problem,
in response to inquiry concerning views on anti-cyclical policy with re-
spect to electric power, it stated a definite belief in the importance of its
influence on the flow of investment in regulated industries. 86  Its letter
emphasized, in common with those of all the public utility commissions
covered by the survey, that its control over investment did not extent to
the power to initiate expansion, but only to the negative device of pre-
venting it.'8 7
This throws crucial emphasis on the "shortage" or "backlog" situa-
tion, which did in fact obtain in the natural gas industry following the last
war. The Commission's "negative" controls could have been used at that
point in restricting the growth of the industry with a view to "orderly"
expansion which would not "dislocate" other sectors of the economy. As
it stated in regard to control over electric power, however, the FPC did
183. See H. R. REP. No. 1290, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1942), and Hearings
before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign. Conzanerce on H.R. 5249, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1941). In 1950, a bill was introduced into Congress which would
have given the FPC complete control over all securities issued by natural gas companies,
rather than over only those issued in connection with a project for which a certificate
is required. The bill was never reported out of committee, but see Hearings, supra
note -177.
1 184. Granted that business cycle analysts have many differences, there is little dispute
over the contention that the flow of investment in durabl6 goods is a vital factor. See
HABERLER, PROSPERITY AND DEPRESSION c. 8, 9, 10, and in particular 205, 239, 272, 290
(1937); HANSEN, BUSINESS CYCLES AND NATIONAL INCOME C. 16 (1951). From 1942
through 1952, natural gas investment certificated by the FPC totalled $3,165,000,000. See
32 FPC ANN. REP. 15 (1952). Total natural gas investment planned for the period
running from 1952-1956 is about $5,000,000,000. See OIL AND GAS JoURN., April 20, 1953,
p. 101.
185. Tyndall, The Stabilization of Investment in Two Public Utility Indistries, 25
LAND ECONOMics 382 (1949).
186. Id. at 394-395.
187. Ibid. The same letter pointed out, however, that informal means such as
publication of forecasts of long run demand and the "advising" of natural gas companies
could be used to stimulate investment in slack periods.
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not feel justified in applying anti-cyclical control in shortage situations. 8 8
The dilemma raised is a fundamental one for democratic attempts at
"planned" investment. Where backlog conditions prevail, a "planning"
Commission may have to choose between satisfying consumers as fast as
they want to be satisfied and risking dislocations over broad areas of
the economic system.'8 9
Here again, at the point where the Commission is asked to lead
rather than follow consumers, the limits of the administrative process are
reached. The FPC starts, as a public utility commission must, with the
protection of consumers. At every level of the certification process one
finds that the demand criterion is primary. The "natural" monopoly
issue, in the first instance, is a conflict over the best means for the provi-
sion of adequate service to consumers. The 1942 amendment does pro-
vide a statutory basis for the protection of coal interests, but even here
the Commission has been loath to act, except where it is clear that the
interests of natural gas consumers are identified with those of coal and the
railroads through the medium of conservation policy. When Olds and
Draper suggest that the FPC should enter further into control over the
end-use of gas, in becoming a "regional planning" commission, the con-
flict of ideals engendered makes resort to political and legislative discus-
sion necessary.
Similarly, the magnitude of the investments involved in the building
of natural gas pipelines makes even negative control over their flow a
potent source of power in the American economy. Without legislative
discussion, such control in the name of anti-cyclical policy is no more to
be desired than the implementation of Olds-Draper regional development
ideals under similar circumstances. There is little surprise in the conclu-
sion that ultimate federal responsibility, in public utility fields as else-
wvhere, lies, with Congress. To single out the Commission in an attack
upon "narrowness" is to attempt to make one aspect of the governmental
process bear responsibility for the whole.
188. Ibid.
189. See WRIGHT, DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESS 76-78 (1949).
